PERCEPTION AND MATHEMATICAL INTUITION
Penelope Maddy S ET theoretic realism is a view whose main tenets are that sets exist independently of human thought, and that set theory is the science of these entities.1 The foremost advocate of this position, the late Professor Gddel, has stressed an analogy between mathematics and physical science.2 According to G6del, higher set theory bears a relation to the rest of mathematical knowledge and to practical mathematical dealings of everyday life which is analogous to the relation borne by theoretical physics to physical science in general and to common sense knowledge of the world. Sense perception gives us knowledge of simple facts about physical objects, and a faculty of mathematical intuition gives us knowledge of sets, numbers,3 and of some of the simpler axioms concerning them. In both cases, theories involving "unobservable" entities or processes (that is, entities or processes beyond the range of sense perception or mathematical intuition) are formed in order to explain, predict, and systematize the elementary facts (of perception or intuition) and are judged by their success.
A view of this sort has several attractive features: i) it allows a straightforward Tarskian semantics for set theoretic discourse, ii) it makes no mystery of how mathematical premises can combine with physical ones to yield testable consequences in physical science (that is, both sorts of premises are true in the same sense), iii) it squares with the prephilosophical views of most working ' The term 'Platonism' is often applied to views of this sort, but I will avoid it. To me 'realism' seems more appropriate, since sets, on the view I am concerned with, are taken to be individuals or particulars, not universals.
2 K. Gbdel, "Russell's Mathematical Logic" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. P. A. Schilpp (Tudor, 1944) , pp. 123-153, reprinted in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, eds., Philosophy of Mathematics (Prentice-Hall, 1964) , pp. 211-232, and "What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?" in American Mathematical Monthly, 54 (1947), pp. 515-525, reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam, ibid., pp. 258-273. 'Numbers, at least in the version of realism I will sketch, are taken to be properties of sets, and are brought within the general set theoretic epistemology in that way. The details of this move cannot be dealt with in this paper. See my " Sets and Numbers," unpublished. mathematicians, and iv) it allows set theoretic practice to remain as it is; it does not demand reform. On these last two counts, it differs from the holistic form of realism advocated by Quine. On the holistic view, mathematics is a highly theoretical part of the web of knowledge, justified by its usefulness in physical science. But set theorists do not generally suppose that the truth or falsity of their axioms is so intimately linked with applicability in science, and their methods can be seen to reflect this.
Despite its obvious attractions, realism has met with considerable opposition from philosophers. Benacerraf4 has argued that philosophies of mathematics can be divided into two groups: those inspired by ontological considerations, and those inspired by epistemological considerations. Realism falls in the first group, dealing straightforwardly with questions of what mathematical objects exist, and what mathematical statements mean, at the expense of questions of how we know mathematical facts. Benacerraf's central objection to Godel is that even if the hypothetico-deductive model of the higher reaches of set theory were unproblematic,5 this would not be very comforting until much more could be said about how mathematical intuition supplies us with the sort of knowledge on which the edifice is to be based. Specifically, an account of how the analogous faculty-sense perception-provides us with knowledge of physical objects begins with a causal interaction between the knower and the object (or fact) known, but no such interaction seems possible in the case of sets.
Since the invention of the Kripke/Putnam theory of reference,6 'P. Benacerraf, "Mathematical Truth," Journal of Philoaophy, 70, no. 19 (8 November 1973), pp. 661-679. 'Little is understood about the concepts of explanation and prediction in the context of mathematics, but some promising work has been done by M. Steiner (e.g., "Mathematical Explanation," Philosophical Studies, 34 (1978), pp. 135-151) . Still, persuasive cases can be made for such axiom candidates as the axiom of measurable cardinals and the axiom of projective determinacy in terms of their explanatory scope and so on. I won't go into this part of the problem in this paper. For some discussion of these issues, see "Sets and Numbers." 'S. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Reidel, 1972), pp. 253-355; H. Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning', " in K. Gunderson, ed., Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII (Minnesota, 1975). this style of objection has been extended, for example, by Lear, 7 to include the realist's claim that set theoretic statements are about sets. In physical science, we refer to things and kinds of things by virtue of standing at the end of a complex causal chain of usage leading back to dubbing. But, it seems that no sample of the kind 'set' could be vulnerable to such an initial baptism. So, the argument runs, not only are we unable to know facts about sets, but we are also unable to refer to them, so in fact, our theory of sets cannot be about them.
Taking Gddel's remarks as a starting point, I will try to sketch an account of perception and intuition which will skirt these objections, and provide a basis for set theoretic realism. I will not attempt to prove, or even argue for, the independent existence of sets, but rather, on the realistic assumption that they do so exist, I will try to show how we can refer to and know about them. Since accusations to the contrary are most often based on causal theories of reference and knowledge, I will use these theories as starting points. I will not attempt to defend the causal theories (I don't pretend to know which are the correct theories of knowledge and reference), but I will try to show that they are reconcilable with set theoretic realism. My success should be judged by the plausibility of the proposed epistemology, and by the extent to which it preserves the virtues listed above and squares with other reasonable tenets and motivations for set theoretic realism.
I. THE OBJECTIONS OF BENACERRAF AND LEAR
Let's begin with the problem of reference. The part of the causal theory that is relevant here is the theory of reference to kinds. Of course, the theory of kinds on which this depends has not been completely worked out, but I think it is clear that some common nouns, like 'gold' and 'water' are more amenable to this treatment than some others, like 'bachelor' and 'home run', which seem better suited to a traditional theory according to which terms refer to whatever satisfies their conditions of definition. As one theorist puts it, in these latter cases:8 7J. Lear, "Sets and Semantics,"Journal ofPhilosophy, 74, no. 2 (February 1977) , pp. 86-102.
We do not have some kind of thing in mind, name it, and then seek to discover what it is we have named as we do in the case of 'gold' or 'tiger'. Rather, we have a certain specification or description in mind, and define anything that satisfies the description as having a right to the name.
I think it is clear that the realist would take 'set' to be more like 'gold' than like 'bachelor' in terms of this contrast. Sets exist, and we inquire into their nature.
According to the causal theory, successful reference to a natural kind is accomplished by means of a chain of communication from the referrer back to an initial baptism. (Of course, the baptist refers without such a chain, but most of us are rarely in that role.) One member of this chain acquires the word by means of a causal interaction with the previous link; that is, I learn a word, in part, by hearing it, reading it, or some such sensory experience, caused, in part, by my predecessor in the chain.9 The chain of communication for sets is no more problematic than for any other word. I learn it from my teachers and intend my usage to refer to what theirs refers to.
The trouble is supposed to be with the initial baptism. This is an imaginary event in which the baptist isolates some samples of the kind, and picks out the kind of which these samples are members. According to Kripke, these baptisms are of at least two sorts: by description and by ostension. As an example of the first sort, we might imagine that the kind 'gold' was first picked out as the stuff instantiated by all or most of the samples in Fort Knox. Here there need be no causal connection between the baptist and the sample: This is perfectly acceptable so long as the description is well-founded,10 that is, so long as the singular and general terms occurring in the description already refer. In our example, 'Fort Knox' must already refer to the appropriate building by means (presumably) of a causal chain back to another baptism.
In the case of sets, such a baptism by description doesn't seem possible. How could samples of the kind be picked out For simplicity, and because they are not relevant to my central concerns, I have left out of this account many of the complexities of the causal theory of reference.
"See M. Jubien, " Ontology and Mathematical Truth," Nous, 11, no. 2 (May 1977), p. 136. without assuming the kind is already picked out? (For example, suppose the baptist says, "Set is the kind of which the set of my hands is a sample.") Baptism by ostension is clearly what Lear had in mind when he wrote: "
There is no standard set with which one stands in the necessary causal relation to make it vulnerable to the appropriate dubbing.
I will question this claim.
In an ostensive baptism of gold, a baptist would stand before some samples, look at them, and declare that these and all things like them are gold. Let us imagine an analogous initial baptism of sets. We imagine our baptist in his study saying things like: "All the books on this shelf, taken together, regardless of order, form a set," and, "The globe, the inkwell, and the pages in this notebook, taken together, in no particular order, form a set." By this process, the baptist picks out samples of a kind. The word 'set' refers to the kind of which these samples are members. One important feature of this treatment is that we can refer to sets without knowing much about them, just as we first referred to gold without knowing that it has atomic number 79, or how it differs from iron pyrites. And, just as gold on other planets, and gold that doesn't look like gold, are included within the scope of the kind 'gold', pure sets, and infinite sets are included within the kind 'set'; all that matters is that they are the same kind of thing.
The obvious objection for Lear to this picture of set theoretic reference is that, while the gold dubber causally interacts with some samples, the set dubber causally interacts only with the members of some samples. Here the realist might argue:'2 the extent of the causal interactions of both the set and the gold dubber is something like light bouncing off certain objects and bringing about some retinal changes. In the case of the gold dubber, strictly speaking, the interaction is actually with the front side of a time slice of the sample. In other words, the thing whose kind we count the person as having dubbed is not the thing with which the dubber has actually causally interacted; the J. Lear, op. cit., p. 88. 12 That an argument of this sort might be available to the realist was first suggested to me by John P. Burgess. interaction is only with a fleeting aspect of that temporally extended object. Similarly, the set dubber has only aspects of the sets within his causal grasp. But, if the interaction of the gold dubber with an aspect is enough to allow the gold dubber to pick out a sample, why shouldn't the set dubber's interaction with an aspect do the same thing? The realist could argue that the relation of element to set is no more objectionable than the relation of fleeting aspect to temporally extended object.'3 If this argument can be filled in, it seems the realist can adopt a causal theory of reference, after all.
Of course, Benacerraf's epistemological objection to realism runs parallel to the above. On a theory of knowledge of the sort suggested by Goldman and Harman,'4 in the simplest perceptual cases, there must be an appropriate causal connection between the knower and the fact known. And, once again, sets seem unable to enter into causal relations. And, still again, in cases in which the causal theorist would admit that knowledge of a physical object is acquired, it is still only an aspect of the object in question which participates in the causal interaction.
G6del responds to the challenge of the causal theorists by insisting that mathematical intuition is to play a role in the development of set theory analogous to that of sense perception in the development of physical science.'5 In particular, it is mathematical intuition that inspires us to form mathematical theories and convinces us of the truth of their axioms. To fill in the analogy, he considers the details of perceptual experience. According to G6del, our physical concepts are formed on the basis of what is immediately given, but the immediately given is not to be taken as some form of unstructured data. He writes:
13 Of course, the set dubber's interaction is also with mere fleeting aspects of the elements of his sets, so the relation between what he interacts with, and what's kind he dubs, is the composition of the aspect/object and the element/set relations. This added complexity can be eliminated by imagining that the set dubber uses sets of aspects, rather than sets of objects, as samples. A more reasonable course is to assume that if both the relations in question are legitimate, then so is their composition.
14A. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," Journal of Philosophy, 64, no. 12 Uune 1967), pp. 357-372; G. Harman, Thought (Princeton, 1973 That something besides the sensations actually is immediately given follows . . . from the fact that our ideas referring to physical objects contain constituents qualitatively different from sensations or mere combinations of sensations, e.g., the idea of object itself.
Some structure, over and above mere stimulations, is immediately given because our perceptual beliefs are about objects. He does not specify any more of these "abstract elements contained in our empirical ideas," but he does emphasize that they are not contributed by the mind, because "we cannot create any qualitatively new elements, but only reproduce and combine those that are already given."
The question, then, is where these abstract elements of perceptual experience originate, if they do not enter by way of the sense organs, and are not contributed by the mind. To account for their presence, Godel postulates "another kind of relationship between ourselves and reality," apart from the causal effect of physical objects on the sense organs. Finally, he tells us that the immediately given of mathematical intuition, from which we form our concept of set and learn the truth of some of the axioms concerning it, is "closely related" to these abstract elements. Presumably, the faculty of mathematical intuition itself is "closely related" to this new sort of relationship between ourselves and reality which is responsible for the presence of these abstract elements in our perceptual experience.
This suggestion is hardly a complete solution, both because it has never been conclusively established that the mind can contribute nothing beyond reproductions and combinations of what is presented to it from outside, and because so little is said about this new relationship between ourselves and reality. At first, it might seem hardly more valuable than the suggestion given earlier to the effect that the set theoretic realist must argue for some sort of similarity between the aspect/object relation and the element/set relation. But Gddel's approach does represent a definite advance, in that it suggests that the nature of mathematical intuition can be better understood in light of an investigation of the origin and role of the abstract elements of perceptual experience.
The what's kind is dubbed, in the case the causal theorist accepts? I think the key here is that it is not enough simply for the baptist's or knower's retinas to be stimulated by light bouncing off the front surface of an object; what is required is that the baptist or knower perceive the object. This is made clear by examples of people, blind from birth, whose sense organs are restored to perfect operating condition, but who cannot be said to perceive the objects around them.16 The realist's point, then, is that stimulation of the sense organs by light bounced off an object is not the same as perception of that object, as Godel has pointed out. The realist's hope is that an account of what makes a pattern of sensory stimulation into a perception of a physical object could be modified into an account of how it is possible to interact with a set of physical objects in the way required by the causal theories of reference and knowledge.
To this end, I will argue below that people often perceive sets of physical objects. I will do this by extending a particular theory of perception of physical objects. The theory of object perception itself is naturally open to objection, but I will not defend it here since this is done elsewhere by its original proponents, and an extension of the sort I am interested in can probably be added to most any theory of object perception. An obvious exception is sense-data theories according to which it is not even possible, strictly speaking, to perceive physical objects. Such theories seem to me false, and I refer the reader elsewhere in the literature for reasons.17 Finally, though, let me repeat that I do not suppose that any arguments I might give for the theory of set perception and the theory of intuition sketched below are conclusive. First, I doubt that it is possible to give conclusive philosophical arguments for a view of this sort, since many of the questions involved are empirical. But the main obstacle is that I have not and will not attempt to prove the existence of sets, and a theory according to which they are perceptible certainly presupposes or entails this. nominalistic leanings will be able easily to provide alternative readings of the evidence, and to avoid accepting what is sketched below. My limited goal here is not to convince them, but to sketch a reasonable epistemology for the realist. So, what is said below should be judged by its plausibility from the realist's point of view, and by the extent to which it squares with other tenets of realism in the philosophy of set theory.
II. PERCEIVING OBJECTS
The following account of what it is for a person to perceive (visually) an object at a given location under normal conditions is derived from Pitcher's. 18 P perceives an x at 1 if and only if i) there is an x at 1; ii) P acquires perceptual beliefs about x, in particular, that there is an x at 1; iii) the x at 1 is involved in the generation of this perceptual belief state in an appropriate causal way (in the kind of way, for example, my hand is responsible for my perceptual belief that there is a hand before me when I look at my hand in good light).
It should be noted that this account is intended to capture a strict sense of perception according to which, for example, a hunter does not perceive a pheasant hen sitting motionless in her nest if she blends too perfectly with her surroundings for him to distinguish her from them. In this case, although the hunter may acquire some perceptual beliefs which are about the hen in a loose sense, he does not acquire any which are about her in a strict sense-for example, the perceptual belief that there is a pheasant hen in such-and-such a location. 19 Clause iii) is familiar from Grice,20 and guarantees that if P perceives an x at 1, in this strict sense, then P knows that there is an x at 1. Several terms in clause ii) require clarification. First, let us assume that beliefs are psychological states. Whether or not these states are dispositional, and whether or not dispositions are to be analyzed in purely behavioristic terms, are questions which need not be raised here, so long as it is admitted that behavioral evidence can be used to support claims that persons hold certain beliefs. Further, we assume that beliefs are neither necessarily conscious nor necessarily linguistic. 21 Perceptual beliefs, in particular, are nonconscious, and probably partly nonlinguistic. Perceptual belief states are also extremely rich, that is, for example, for P to acquire the (visual) perceptual belief that there is a tree outside the window, he must also acquire a great variety of other perceptual beliefs, depending on the Occasion, such as, that the tree is roughly so big, so far away, that it is in leaf, swaying in the breeze, and so on. ' And perceptual beliefs are not inferred from other beliefs. The components of a perceptual state-that is, the members of a complex set of perceptual beliefs which are all acquired on one occasionoften influence one another. A perceptual belief about the identity of an object, for example, can influence perceptual beliefs about its shape and size, and (obviously) vice versa. The beliefs which make up a perceptual state arise in a body, not in an inferential sequence. Thus any belief acquired on a given occasion which influences and is influenced by perceptual beliefs acquired on that occasion is to be considered a perceptual belief, a part of the overall perceptual state.24
A philosophical theory of perception of the sort sketched above is defended by Pitcher; it bears a strong resemblance to 21 Cf. D. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge, 1973) [McGraw Hill, 1966] and The Intelligent Eye [McGraw Hill, 1970] ) to the view that perceptual beliefs are inferred from stimulations. Harman calls these inferences "automatic" to distinguish them from ordinary inferences of beliefs from other beliefs. I think it is clear that stimulations should not be thought of as beliefs since they are not behavior-guiding until they become perceptions. I will reserve 'inference' for inference of beliefs from other beliefs, and call perceptual beliefs 'noninferential '. 4 G. Pitcher, op. cit., pp. 103, 108. that of Armstrong and has affinities with various psychological theories of perception as information acquisition.25 Many possible objections to a view of this sort, some of them fairly obvious, are met by Pitcher in his final version of the view, which is much more subtle than the crude first approximation presented here. Goldman" presents some additional, more difficult objections. He cites the behavior-guiding character of some perceptual states, their cognitive content, their classificatory function, and the fact that they are often influenced by higher cognitions as evidence that many perceptual states have belief content. This is not, he adds, enough to show that all perceptual states are simply sets of beliefs. Some perceptual states might lack belief content, and others, though they possess belief content, might not be exhausted by it. This is surely correct, but we are interested here in a strict sense of 'P perceives an x at 1', and I think some belief content-in particular, the perceptual belief that there is an x at 1-is clearly required for that perceptual state. In other words, the perceptual states in which we are interested do all have belief content, and it will make no difference to us whether or not this belief content exhausts the perceptual state. So the controversy between Goldman and the belief-theorists, Pitcher and Armstrong, need not detain us. Difficult questions which are relevant here include the following: what perceptual beliefs is a given perceiver capable of acquiring on a given occasion, and how can we tell which ones the perceiver actually does acquire on that occasion?27 Clearly, P cannot acquire a perceptual belief that there is a DC-10 overhead if P doesn't know what a DC-10 is, or, in more philosophical terminology, if P lacks the concept of a DC-10. I will assume, with Armstrong,28 that to have a concept is just to have the capacity for beliefs of a certain sort, and that having a capacity, in turn, is being in a certain psychological state. The Godelian question from which this inquiry arose was: how does the idea of a physical object come to be present in our experience? This can now be rephrased as: what makes us capable of acquiring perceptual beliefs about physical objects? or, how do we come to have the concept of a physical object? Psychologists and neurophysiologists have produced some interesting behavioral and neurophysiological results and theories in an attempt to provide an answer to these questions, and, in general, to the question of how and when various conceptual elements enter human perceptual states. I will review a small portion of this work.
There is considerable experimental evidence that the ability to perceive a primitive distinction between a figure and its background is inborn in humans and many laboratory animals.' The structure of the retina is probably responsible for the presence of this conceptual information in the human perceptual state, as such a connection has been demonstrated in the case of the frog. McCulloch and his co-workers have isolated various structures in the frog's retina which send impulses to the frog's brain only under certain complex conditions (independent of the level of general illumination)-for example, in the presence of sharp boundaries between relatively light and relatively dark patches, or dark areas with curved edges, or movement of such curved edges. In fact, one fiber"0 (Cambridge, 1965) , p. 254. responds best when a dark object, smaller than a receptive field, enters that field, stops, and moves about intermittently thereafter. The response is not affected if the lighting changes or if the background (say a picture of grass and flowers) is moving, and is not there if only the background, moving or still, is in the field. Could one better describe a system for detecting an accessible bug?
As might be expected, the researchers came to think of these fibers as "bug-detectors," and the frog's behavior certainly suggests that this mechanism enables it to acquire perceptual beliefs about nearby bugs. Similar mechanisms in humans are probably responsible for perceptual beliefs concerning figure and background, and perhaps some concerning distance and size. "
Beyond this fairly simple level, however, the evidence is that the capacity to acquire perceptual beliefs of the familiar sort is not present at birth.32 Psychologists talk of a phenomenon called "identity" in perception. A figure is seen with identity ifit is immediately seen as similar to some other figures but dissimilar to others (that is, as falling in some categories but not in others), and it is easily recalled, recognized, or named. For example, when I see a triangular figure, I immediately see it to be more similar to other triangles than to squares; I can recall it, recognize it, and call it and similar figures 'triangles'. In our terminology, I have acquired the perceptual belief that there is a triangle in front of me. Experiments on newly sighted human patients who have been blind from birth, and on chimpanzees raised in total darkness, demonstrate that the capacity to acquire such a belief (the concept of a triangle), is acquired after considerable sensory experience. For example, Hebb reports:33
Investigators (of vision following operation for congenital cataract) are unanimous in reporting that the perception of a square, circle, or triangle, or of sphere or cube, is very poor. To see one of these as a whole object, with distinctive characteristics immediately evident, is not possible for a long period. The most intelligent and best-motivated patient has to seek corners pain-31E.g., T. Bower, "The Visual World of Infants," Scientific American, 217 (1968), pp. 80-92. 32 This has little to do with the philosophical controversy over innate ideas because even defenders of that view admit that something sensory is needed to "draw out" or "awaken" innate ideas. stakingly even to distinguish a triangle from a circle.... A patient was trained to discriminate square from triangle over a period of 13 days, and had learned so little in this time "that he could not report their form without counting corners one after another.... And yet it seems that the recognition process was beginning already to be automatic, so that some day the judgement 'square' could be given with simple vision, which would then easily lead to the belief that form was always simultaneously given".
Similar results are obtained with the chimpanzees.
Given that such a simple capacity as the ability to see a triangle as more like another triangle than like a square is the product of considerable sensory experience, it is to be expected that so complex a talent as that of seeing a series of different patterns as aspects of one thing-that is, as a series of views of one physical object-is not present at birth. This expectation is substantiated by experiments of-Piaget and his colleagues. 34 The child's ability to acquire perceptual beliefs about physical objects, as judged from behavior, develops between the ages of about one month and two years. At the beginning of this period, objects exist for the child when they are in the child's field of vision, and cease to exist afterward. 35 At its end, the child clearly possesses the concept of an independently existing physical object, and is fully able to acquire perceptual beliefs about physical objects.
Supposing then, as it seems we should, that the ability to perceive triangles or physical objects-that is, the ability to acquire perceptual beliefs about them-is itself acquired, what can be said about how this is accomplished? The most promising theory is a neurophysiological one presented by Hebb.36 He sketches an account, of the changes that take place in the brain 'J. Piaget 3 This wording may be a bit too strong. I am grateful to the referee for making me aware of recent work which suggests that it might be more accurate to say that for the younger child, objects don't exist independently of their location or trajectory. Still, the main point remains: a period of development is needed before the child possesses our concept of physical object. when someone acquires the concept of a triangle, that is, when someone develops the ability to see triangles with identity, to gain perceptual beliefs about triangles, to perceive them. The upshot of his view is that repeated eye fixations on the various parts of triangles results (by the growth of synaptic knobs) in the growth of what he calls a "cell assembly." Once the subject has acquired this complete assembly, looking at any triangle will cause it to reverberate for half a second or more, a tremendous advance over the lifespan of the stimulation from a visual pattern for which no assembly has been formed. This longer trace should persist long enough to allow the organic structural changes required for long-term memory to take place. In other words, with the completed cell assembly, the subject is able to see triangles with identity, to acquire perceptual beliefs about them. Thus, the cell assembly is a triangle-detector in much the same sense as the fiber isolated by McCulloch is a bug-detector.
The ability to perceive physical objects is not unlike the ability to perceive triangles, though it is more complex. The trick is to see a series of patterns as constituting views of a single thing. It seems likely37 that what is involved is the development of some complicated phase sequence of cell assemblies. Crudely put, the theory is that human beings develop neural objectdetectors which are responsible for their ability to acquire perceptual beliefs about physical objects. In Gddel's terminology, the presence of the idea of a physical object in our physical experience is due to our object-detectors. Godel has suggested that the presence of this abstract element in our experience is "due to another kind of relationship between ourselves and reality," that is, a relationship other than "the action of certain things upon our sense organs."38 The action of a given physical object on our sense organs, or more precisely, the causal interaction of an aspect of that object with our retinas, is responsible only for our sensations, the pattern of our sensory stimulations. The objectdetector is responsible for the idea of the object itself, and the presence in us of the object-detector is the result of a much more "7J. Bruner, "On Perceptual Readiness," Psychological Review, 64 (1957), p. 237. 38 K. Gbdel, op. cit., p. 272. complex interaction between us and our environment than that which produces the sensations, just as Godel suspects. Part of what is responsible for P's ability to acquire perceptual beliefs about a certain object on a given occasion is the structure of P's brain at birth-a result of evolutionary pressures of the environment on P's ancestors-and part is the sum of those early interactions between P and objects which resulted in P's objectdetector. This evolutionary pressure of the environment, plus our youthful interactions with it, make up G6del's "other relationship." Note that while it is complex, it is still causal. Now recall that what was required by the causal theories over and above a causal interaction of the baptist or knower with an aspect of the object was that the baptist or knower perceive the object. And P will perceive an x at 1 if P acquires true perceptual beliefs about it, and the x at 1 is appropriately causally involved in the generation of P's perceptual belief state. Finally, I have argued that the x at 1 is appropriately causally involved if an aspect of the x at 1 stimulates P's object-detector. 
III. PERCEIVING SETS
What I want to suggest now is simply that we do acquire perceptual beliefs about sets of physical objects, and that our ability to do this develops in much the same way as that in which our ability to perceive physical objects develops, as described in the previous section. Consider the following case: P needs two eggs for a certain recipe, reaches into the refrigerator for the egg carton, opens it, and sees three eggs there. This belief (that there are three eggs before P) is perceptual because it is an integral part of the body of beliefs making up (or perhaps partly constituting) P's perceptual state. Other perceptual beliefs acquired on this occasion probably include details about the size and color of the eggs, the fact that two eggs can be selected from among the three in various ways, the locations of the particular eggs in the nearly empty carton, and so on. The numerical beliefs are clearly part of this complex of perceptual beliefs because they can influence the others as well as being influenced by them. (For example, the welcome fact that there are enough eggs for the recipe can make the eggs themselves look larger.) So, the various numerical beliefs acquired on this occasion are perceptual, and I further claim that they are beliefs about a set, that is, I claim P acquires the perceptual beliefs that there is a set of eggs before P. that it is three-membered, and that it has various two-membered subsets.
The most obvious objection to this claim is that sets do not have location, so P cannot perceive a set before him in the egg carton. Here I must agree that many sets, the empty set or the set of real numbers, for example, cannot be said to have location, but I disagree in the case of sets of physical objects. It seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that such sets have location in time-for example, that the singleton containing a given object comes into and goes out of existence with that object. In the same way, a set of physical objects has spatial location insofar as its elements do. The set of eggs, then, is located in the egg carton-that is, exactly where the physical aggregate made up of the eggs is located.39
A more difficult question is why the numerical perceptual beliefs in question should not be considered to be beliefs about the physical aggregate, not the set. These beliefs are beliefs that something or other has a number property, and Frege40 has soundly defeated the view that a physical aggregate alone can have such a property. Frege's own solution' is that such beliefs "The arguments of Benacerraf and Lear considered earlier involve an inference from the fact that sets are abstract objects to the claim that we cannot causally interact with sets. Abstract objects are supposed not to exist in space and time, which presumably provides at least part of the support for this inference. I have now denied that abstract objects cannot exist in space and time, and suggested that sets of physical objects do so exist. (Note that M. Jubien in "Ontology and Mathematical Truth," Nous, 11 no. 2 (May 1977) pp. 146-147, seems to agree. These are what he calls 'saturated sets'.) On the basis of this assumption, I will not exactly deny that sets cannot participate in causal interactions (causal interactions are still, strictly speaking, with aspects of objects), but I will suggest that such sets can play a role in the generation of our perceptual beliefs about them which is analogous to that played by physical objects in the generation of our perceptual beliefs about them.
' G. Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. Austin (Northwestern, 1968), sec. 23. 41 Ibid., sec. 46.
are about concepts, but it seems no less plausible to suppose that they are actually about extensions of concepts, or in other words, sets. Another popular candidate for the object of such beliefs is the physical aggregate coupled in some way with a property (in our example, the physical aggregate made up of the eggs together with the property of being an egg). Clearly, this view enjoys no ontological advantage over the one I have suggested, involving, as it does, properties instead of sets. Furthermore, I find it hard to be sure what the difference is between believing that 'three' applies to a particular physical aggregate under the property 'egg' and believing that a particular set of eggs is three-membered. What is the set over and above the physical aggregate individuated in a certain way? If there is no difference between these, then it would be impossible to acquire a perceptual belief about the one, without, at the same time, acquiring a perceptual belief about the other. Perhaps, on some views, the difference is that if one egg is moved to a different slot in the egg carton, we are still confronted with the same set (although its location is different), but we might (depending on our definitions) be confronted with a different aggregate. If this is the difference, it seems to be more evidence for the claim that the belief that there are three eggs in the carton is actually about the set of eggs, and not about the physical aggregate, because P surely believes that moving one egg (barring mishap) will not affect the fact that there are three. This dispute about the object of belief probably cannot be finally resolved without a careful comparison of the merits of various philosophies of mathematics in which the competing answers might be embedded, but fortunately, this need not be done here. From the point of view of set theoretic realism-that is, from the point of view adopted here-the supposition that these perceptual beliefs are about the set of eggs in the carton is clearly the simplest and most reasonable, so we will make it. Given, then, that these perceptual beliefs are about sets, how do we come by the capability to acquire such beliefs? Once again, the behavioral evidence collected by Piaget and his colleagues suggests that this capability develops in stages similar to those marked in the development of the ability to perceive physical objects, though at a later age, between about seven and eleven years.42 Before the beginning of this period, a child may be able to classify objects into groups in a consistent way (say squares with squares, triangles with triangles), but the child does not grasp the inclusion relation. For the younger child, the set ceases to exist when its subsets are attended to, while for the older child, the set remains stable and contains various other sets as subsets.
A similar confusion is observed in connection with a set's number properties. The younger child imagines that the number of elements in a set changes when it is rearranged, especially when its elements are moved closer together or farther apart. In older children, by contrast, once a one-to-one correspondence between two sets has been established, the belief in their equinumerosity cannot be shaken; indeed the very question seems silly to them. Once the concept is in place and a set is perceived, the thought that it should change its number properties when its elements are moved about (barring mishap) is preposterous.
It should be noted that the child's development of the set concept is not a linguistic achievement. Of course, children are rarely taught the word 'set', but they are taught number words, and it might be thought that their early errors are primarily verbal, and that it is verbal instruction that brings about their correction. The evidence, however, is against this assumption. One must expect that the set concept could be developed, just as the object concept, in the complete absence of language.
How is the set concept-in particular the ability to acquire perceptual beliefs about sets-itself acquired? It has been indicated that behavioral evidence suggests the set concept is developed 4'J. Piaget and A. Szeminska, The Child's Conception of Number, trans. C. Gattegno and F. Hodgson (Humanities, 1952) ; J. Phillips, op. cit., ch. 4. Once again, the referee has brought to my attention some more recent work which suggests this time that these abilities are acquired much earlier, say between two-and-a-half and five years of age. Of course, for my argument, the only crucial point is that some of this material is learned in much the same way as the analogous material about physical objects. over a period of time like the object concept. These studies also suggest that the determining factor in these developments is repeated exposure to and manipulation of the sort of things in question. The development of the object concept is brought about by children's experiences with various physical objects in their environment, and the set concept by experiences with sets of physical objects-for example, by forming one-to-one correspondences between them, by regrouping them to form subsets, and so on. Hebb's theory of the formation of the neural triangle-detector made essential use of the behavioral evidence that development of the ability to see triangles with identity requires repeated fixations on corners of triangular figures, eye movements from one corner to another, and even, in some cases, active seeking out of corners. It has already been theorized that an object-detector develops in a similar way, as a result of various experiences with physical objects in the environment. Given the evidence that the set concept requires a similar developmental period and repeated experience with sets in the environment parallel to the required experiences with triangles and physical objects, it seems reasonable to assume that these interactions with sets of physical objects bring about structural changes in the brain by some complex process resembling that suggested by Hebb, and that the resulting neural 'set-detector' is what enables adults to perceive sets. On this account, then, when P looks into the egg carton, i) there is a set of eggs in the carton, ii) P acquires some perceptual beliefs about this set of eggs, and iii) the set of eggs in the carton is appropriately causally responsible for P's perceptual belief state. The involvement of the set of eggs in the generation of P's belief state is the same as that of my hand in the generation of my belief that there is a hand before me when I look at it in good light, namely, an aspect of the thing interacts causally with the retinas, stimulating the appropriate detector. P perceives the set of eggs before him; P knows there is a set of eggs before him; indeed, P knows this set of eggs is three-membered and contains various two-element subsets, because these facts are appropriately causally responsible for P's belief in them. As in the case of knowledge of physical objects, it is the presence of the appropriate detector which legitimizes the gap between what is causally interacted with, and what is known about.
It should be noted that on this account a given causal interaction of an aspect of an object with P's retinas is enough to satisfy the causal requirement for P's perceiving, or acquiring knowledge about, various different things-for example, a time slice, an object, or a set. The thing perceived, or the pieces of knowledge acquired, on a given occasion are determined by the belief content of P's perceptual state, that is, by which perceptual beliefs P actually acquires on that occasion. This, in turn, depends on which detectors are actually stimulated. Though P is capable of perceiving sets, he may, on a given occasion, perceive only the objects themselves, because he is not interested in how many there are, or how they can be classified. In such cases, the setdetector is not stimulated, probably as a result of neural gating mechanisms which correspond to the degree of attention or inattention. "
It is now clear that any baptist with the requisite detector could have picked out samples of the kind 'set' in the way suggested earlier. This is sufficient for dubbing the kind 'set' if, in fact, sets do form a kind. I have indicated that, from the point of view of the set theoretic realist, the treatment of sets as forming a kind is much more likely to be correct than a more traditional theory according to which a set is anything which satisfies certain conditions. Using the account of perception just given, it is possible to give further support to the view that sets form a kind by noting a perceptual similarity relation associated with that kind.45 Our perceiver P is likely to think a dozen eggs is more like an encyclopedia than like the sky. The reason is that the first two subjects immediately suggest classification and numerability, and attention to such details is the alteration of the neural gating mechanisms which brings the setdetector to a state of increased sensitivity and makes it more likely to fire. In other words, P is likely to acquire perceptual beliefs about the set of eggs (that there are twelve) and the set of books (that it is made up of two subsets, positioned on adjacent shelves)-in short, to perceive sets-in the first two cases. This 4'J. Bruner, op. cit., For the connection between kinds and similarity, see W. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia, 1969), pp. 114-138. is not so in the third; hence the perceived similarities and dissimilarities. The kind, then, consists of those things similar to the samples. I cannot argue conclusively that sets form a kind, since the theory of kinds on which the causal theory rests has not been fully worked out by its advocates. Given what has been said so far in support of the claim that they do, however, and given that causal theorists arguing against set theoretic realism tend to deny that there is an appropriate connection between baptist and sample-not that sets form a kind-I will assume that a complete theory of kinds should include the kind 'set'. This kind can be dubbed by picking out samples, as described above. Particular sets and less inclusive kinds can then be picked out by description, for example, 'the set with no elements' for the empty set, or 'those sets whose transitive closures contain no physical objects' for the kind of pure sets.46
IV. INTUITION
Three outstanding difficulties for the set theoretic realist were mentioned at the outset. What has been said so far indicates that at least two of these can be overcome, namely, that of how reference to the kind 'set' is established, and that of how simple facts about particular sets of physical objects can be known. But, the set theoretic epistemology sketched above requires that more than simple facts about particular sets and their interrelations be knowable in some "quasi-perceptual" or "intuitive" way. Specifically, at least some of the basic axioms of set theory must be included within this domain of "intuitive evidence." We are left with the problem of how these basic general truths can be known. In this section, I will try to show how this third obstacle can be overcome.
So far, I have sketched a theory according to which various concepts are acquired by means of a complex interaction between a human being and the world over a period of time. To have a concept is to have the ability to acquire certain beliefs, in particular, in the cases we are concerned with, the ability to acquire perceptual beliefs about particular things of the kind concerned on appropriate occasions. It has been theorized that a complex neural structure is the source of the ability to acquire these perceptual beliefs-thus, one perceives a triangle, physical object, or set when one's triangle-, physical object-, or setdetector is stimulated. What I want to point out is that the acquisition of each concept is accompanied by the acquisition of some very general beliefs about things of that kind; indeed, the structure of the detector itself determines some very general beliefs about things of the kind it detects. For example, threesidedness if, in a sense, "built into" the triangle-detector in the form of mechanisms stimulating eye movement from one corner to another, just as three-angledness is built in in the form of the detector's three distinct cell assemblies for the corners themselves. Crudely put, then, the very form of one's triangle-detector guarantees that one will believe any triangle to be three-sided. This is, in effect, a general belief about triangles.
Similarly, I suggest that the structure of one's object-detector gives one some very general beliefs about physical objects, among them probably such beliefs as that physical objects can look different from different points of view, or that they do not cease to be when one ceases to see them. Of course, it is deceptive to describe these beliefs in this way since they are not linguistic. A child of three is perfectly capable of perceiving physical objects, and thus has some of these general beliefs, but lacks the linguistic equipment to express them as I have. In short, such beliefs can be had by those who lack the linguistic terms, but not by those who lack the concept. They consist of various beliefs of the form that any thing of the kind of those things which stimulate the object-detector has certain properties. I will call these 'intuitive beliefs'. Like the others, the set-detector embodies intuitive beliefs about things of the kind of those which stimulate it. Among these are probably beliefs that might be expressed as 'sets have number properties', 'sets (other than singletons) have many proper subsets', 'any property determines a set of things which have that property', 'the number property of a set is not changed (barring mishap) by moving its elements'.
As has been stressed, it is possible, in fact usual, to acquire these concepts and intuitive beliefs without acquiring linguistic forms with which to express them. For this reason, I have been somewhat inaccurate even in referring to the concepts involved in our examples as the concepts of triangle, physical object, and set. Obviously, what we ordinarily think of as the geometer's, physicist's, or set theorist's concepts of triangle, physical object, or set, or even what might be described as the everyday meanings of the terms 'triangle', 'physical object', and 'set', are much more sophisticated than the prelinguistic concepts described above. But consider what happens when these "kind" words are introduced into the language, or better, into a particular speaker's idiolect. Some samples of the kind are specified, some triangular figures displayed, some varied physical objects pointed out, some sets indicated,47 and if the teaching is successful, the subject associates the word with the appropriate detector. Without any more scientific training than this, a subject with the requisite linguistic tools is likely to assent most readily to such assertions as: 1) Physical objects exist in space and time. 2) At any moment, a given physical object is in a certain place and moving at a certain speed. and 1') Given any two objects, there is a set whose elements are just those two objects. 2')Any things can be collected into 'a set.
One might say, with Gddel, that such assertions "force themselves upon us as being true."48 My suggestion is that the reason they do this is that they are fairly successful linguistic formulations of various prelinguistic intuitive beliefs. The more accurately the linguistic form reflects the prelinguistic belief, the more striking is the phenomenon of its forcing itself upon us. Attempts to formulate intuitive beliefs in linguistic terms I will call 'intuitions' or 'intuitive principles'.
From this account at least two things follow. First, intuitions can be false. Of course, they can be inaccurate formulations of intuitive beliefs, and false for that reason, but it seems they can also be accurate formulations of incorrect intuitive beliefs. I say this because it seems possible that we could be badly mistaken in the concepts we form, and the intuitive beliefs that go with them. That is, it seems possible that stimulation by aspects of certain things might cause us to form a detector which embodied features very different from those which the things involved actually have. For example, I suppose that physical objects might cease to exist when no one perceives them, or that sets might fail to have number properties, though it is hard for us to imagine such things. Second, it follows that intuitions are more likely to be accurate formulations of intuitive beliefs if they are widely shared. Thus it is legitimate to suspect the claim of a single scientist that a certain principle is intuitive if few others share this opinion. However, it should be noted that scientists often use the words 'intuitive' and 'intuition' in senses different from the ones I am trying to capture here. For example, a scientist sometimes says that his 'intuitions' favor one theory over another. If most anyone can see that the favored theory is simply more compelling than the other, this is probably a case of intuition in the sense I am using here. If, however, the scientist involved actually favors that theory because he knows more about the subject than others who disagree or have no opinion, and sees or suspects that it will turn out better for various theoretical reasons, 'intuition' is being used in a different sense, one which I will avoid here. In such a case, I will say that the favored theory is supported by theoretical evidence, not by intuition.
My suggestion is that intuitions of the sort described here form a basis both for the meaning of the associated linguistic term and for the scientific theory of things of the appropriate kind. In physics, though intuitions clearly play a role, they are rarely made explicit, except when they are overthrown by theoretical considerations, as, for example, 2) above. Intuitions can be false, so no matter how obvious they seem, they must be confirmed like any theory, and like any theory, they can be overthrown. Their status as intuitions, the fact that they force themselves upon us, is some evidence in their favor to begin with, but suf-ficient disconfirming evidence can outweigh this initial advantage.
From the writings of Zermelo on his original axioms and the axiom of choice, the work of Fraenkel on replacement and choice, and the remarks of numerous authors on the iterative conception, historical evidence could be adduced for my claim that intuitions form a basis (but do not exhaust) the scientific theory of sets, that they can be confirmed or disconfirmed like any theory, and that their status as intuitions is evidence in their favor. As an account of how we come to believe various intuitive principles (for example, extensionality or pairing), the theory summarized by this claim seems reasonable, but for an account of how we come to know these principles, something more must be said. The problem is that evidence that a principle is intuitive-that is, evidence for the supposition that it is an accurate formulation of an intuitive belief-is taken as evidence for its truth. If true (or correct)49 intuitive beliefs could be counted as intuitive knowledge, then this would be acceptable; the strength of the "forced-upon-us" phenomenon would determine the strength of the intuitive evidence for the truth of a given intuitive principle, evidence to be weighed along with other confirming and disconfirming evidence. So, the question is whether or not the notion of intuitive knowledge can be reconciled with the causal theory.
The essential steps in this direction have been made by our causal theorist Goldman himself in his discussion of innate knowledge. 5 Recall that Goldman, in an effort to overcome Gettier problems, added to the justified true belief account of knowledge the requirement that there be an appropriate causal connection between the fact known and the knower. Detractors of the idea of innate knowledge have argued that innate beliefs (if there are such) cannot be justified, and thus, cannot be knowledge. Goldman cites examples to show that justification above and beyond the satisfaction of the causal requirement is not necessary for knowledge. If the causal connection between fact believed and believer is appropriate, that is, if it is "an instance of a kind of process which generally leads to true beliefs of the sort in question,"'" then the belief constitutes knowledge. In the case of innate beliefs, he continues, the fact believed is causally responsible for the belief by evolutionary adaptation. This sort of causal connection is appropriate because (presumably) it generally leads to true beliefs. Thus, innate true beliefs constitute knowledge.
Fortunately, in order to apply this work of Goldman, it is not necessary for us to determine whether or not the intuitive beliefs we are concerned with are innate. Certainly human children are born with a propensity for forming the concepts of physical object and set (indeed such rudimentary abilities as those to distinguish figure from ground and to perceive simple groupings are already present), and interaction with objects and sets in the environment causes the child to do so. Assuming for the moment that the intuitive beliefs acquired along the way are true, these facts are causally responsible for the child's beliefs, partly by evolutionary adaptation, and partly by more commonplace causal interactions. This causal connection is (presumably) of a sort that generally leads to true beliefs, and thus, the child's intuitive beliefs constitute knowledge, as required.
In summary, I have sketched a view according to which normal adults possess intuitive, nonlinguistic knowledge of general facts about sets, and intuitive principles like the simpler axioms and the iterative conception are justified by their accuracy in formulating this intuitive knowledge, and by their theoretical merits. This account of our knowledge of the simple axioms of set theory, taken together with the account of the process by which more theoretical axioms are confirmed, forms a view of set theoretic knowledge consistent with the ontological and semantic principles of set theoretic realism in general, and with Gddel's few remarks on the subject in particular.52 51Ibid., p. 116. 52 It should be remarked in passing that the sort of realism presented here V. CHIHARA'S OBJECTIONS I will conclude by considering a few of the criticisms directed at Gbdel's view by Chihara, its most hostile opponent. Many of Chihara's objections concern the arguments by which Godel purports to establish what Chihara calls 'the equisupportive claim', that is, the claim that the assumption that sets exist "is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies, and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence.""3 I am not concerned here with whether or not Gbdel's science/ mathematics analogy establishes this claim, but I am concerned with getting the analogy straight, and I think Chihara fails to do this. I will indicate where I think he goes wrong.
On the interpretation of Gbdel's view which has been offered here, we can acquire perceptual beliefs about the existence of physical objects and of sets of these, and if the physical object or set concerned is appropriately involved in the generation of the belief state, these beliefs amount to knowledge. I have suggested that the physical mechanisms by means of which we acquire these beliefs are similar in the two cases. In response to such reasonings, Chihara remarks:54
At best, the above argument only shows that the same sort of justification can be given for the existence of mathematical objects as for the existence of physical objects. Thus, suppose that the most satisfactory theory we can now come up with to explain the data gathered by scientists working with some new accelerator is a quark theory. Then, at one level of abstraction, the same sort of justification could be given for the existence of quarks as has been given for the existence of positrons. But surely we can't conclude that we would have as much reason to believe in quarks as we have to believe in positrons.
suggests the following answers to the traditional questions in the philosophy of mathematics: i) set theoretic truths are not analytic; they are true by virtue of facts about independently existing sets; ii) intuitive beliefs are a priori because once the concepts are in place, no further experience is needed to support them, and no further experience will count against them (though theoretical evidence might count against their linguistic expressions); iii) it seems that if an object exists, its singleton must also, but the current notion of necessity is inadequate for dealing with this issue. " K. Gbdel, op. cit.,. p. 220; C. Chihara, "On a G6delian Thesis Regarding the Existence of Mathematical Objects," unpublished, p. 1. 5 C. Chihara, op. cit., p. 4.
Here Chihara has switched from the realm of perceptual justification to that of theoretical justification. This suggests that he is thinking of all mathematical existence assumptions as highly theoretical, that he is not taking seriously Gddel's emphasis on a perceptual faculty. This passage can, however, be read metaphorically, that is, simply as claiming that though Godel's justification for believing in sets is of the same sort as the usual justification for believing in physical objects, it is not of the same strength, just as the theoretical case for quarks is not of the same strength as the theoretical case for positrons. But it seems to me that this is not at all obvious unless one (mistakenly) supposes that the justification for believing in sets is purely theoretical. It is probably true that perceptual set-detectors cannot develop before perceptual object-detectors, but once they are in place, I see no reason to suppose that one is more dependable than the other. The error of substituting theoretical justification for perceptual justification is clearly present when Chihara claims:55
Gddel can be seen to be addressing himself to the following sort of question: Given that some people have such and such beliefs and such and such experiences, is it reasonable for them to infer P? But are we supposed to have been in a comparable position at some time before we came to believe in the existence of physical objects?
Of course we were never in such a position with respect to physical objects. Ever since the human eye and brain developed to the point that we were able to perceive objects, we have believed (and presumably, known) that they exist without inferring it. Similarly, we have never been in such a position with respect to sets. Ever since the slightly later period of human pre-history when we acquired the ability to count and to perceive sets, we have also believed in their existence. Naturally, this period is incomparable to that in which the existence of molecules was a matter of scientific debate, so the fact that Godel presents no theoretical argument for the existence of sets along the lines of that once presented for the existence of molecules should come as no surprise. Instead, Godel's case depends on the everyday experience of perceiving sets of physical objects, as, for example, I perceive the set of my fingers when I set out to count them. 55 Ibid., p. 14.
A similar confusion arises in connection with Gddel's discussion of the significance of the failure of Russell's no-class theory, a confusion encouraged by a recalcitrant passage from Gddel:56 [Sets] are in the same sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory theory of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions and in both cases it is impossible to interpret the propositions one wants to assert about these entities as propositions about the 'data', i.e. in the latter case, actually occurring sense perceptions.
This passage surely suggests that the failure of the no-class theory is to be seen as analogous to the failure of phenomenalism though it can be interpreted otherwise.57 Three pages later, however, Godel writes:58
The whole scheme of the no-class theory is of great interest as one of the few examples, carried out in detail, of the tendency to eliminate assumptions about the existence of objects outside the 'data' and to replace them by constructions on the basis of these data....
All this is only a verification of the view defended above that logic and mathematics (just as physics) are built up on axioms of real content which cannot be "explained away".
This passage I take as suggesting that the failure of the no-class theory is analogous to the failure of operationalism in physics.
Whichever of these was Gbdel's intention, it is clear that the second form of the analogy is the correct one on the version of set theoretic realism I have offered here. A phenomenalist might claim that 'I see a book before me' is equivalent in some sense to a statement about actual and possible sensations. The impossibility of such a translation is widely recognized. The analogous claim for the nominalist or no-class theorist would be something to the effect that 'I see a set of books before me' is equivalent to a statement about actual or possible sensations, but so far as I know, no one has suggested this. What is sometimes 56K. Gddel, op. cit., p. 220. 5 A-satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions would presumably include an account of how a physical object brings about my belief that there is a physical object before me by impinging on my sense organs. And, the actual existence of the object is required by such a satisfactory theory. This is not to say that the object is a theoretical construction out of something more primitive. I take "actually occurring sense perceptions" to be perceptual beliefs about objects, not some primitive, unanalyzed data. As Gddel claims, a statement about a physical object cannot be translated exhaustively into a statement about the perceptual beliefs of various observers. claimed is that there being such a set is no more than there being an open sentence of a certain sort, or better yet, a sequence of marks of a certain sort. But, for my belief that there is a set of books before me to be in fact a belief about a sequence of marks, those marks must be appropriately involved in the generation of my belief state, and they clearly are not. From this point of view, nominalism seems even more implausible than phenomenalism.
The better form of the analogy is between the no-class theory and operationalism. The idea is that classical mathematics, especially analysis, cannot be done without existence assumptions beyond those of nominalistic systems like no-class theory, just as physics cannot be done without treating theoretical entities as something more than operationally definable fictions. Chihara's response to this form of the analogy59 is to suggest that there is no reason to suppose that classical mathematics is true, unless it is its applications in science, and that as much mathematics as is needed in science can be done within a nominalistically acceptable system. Whether or not this can be done, Godel certainly does not believe that the only reason for believing classical mathematics to be true is its applicability; mathematical perception and intuition give us additional reason to believe it true. Of course, Godel does not present a theory of these faculties, so Chihara is to be forgiven his skepticism. I hope the theory presented here has increased the plausibility of the view that there are mathematical experiences (perceptions) and intuitions, and that these lend support to the theoretical parts of set theory beyond what is available from the successful applications of mathematics in science.
Chihara raises an objection of a different sort when he charges that the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel presents a problem for the set theoretic realist. He cites Mostowski's remark that:60
Probably we shall have in the future essentially different intuitive notions of sets just as we have different notions of space, and will base our discussion 5 C. Chihara, op. cit., p. 5, and Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle (Cornell, 1973) of sets on axioms which correspond to the kind of sets which we want to study.... everything in the recent work on foundations of set theory points toward the situation which I just described.
From this, Chihara concludes that "For Godel ... the proliferation of set theories poses the thorny problem of determining which of the many set theories is the one that most truly describes the real world of sets."'" Of course, the analogy between the status of the parallel postulate and that of the continuum hypothesis is not exact.62 Godel points out' that when the parallel postulate was shown to be independent, mathematical evidence was no longer relevant to the question of its truth or falsity. Non-euclidean geometries were developed so that the question of which geometry best suits the physical world could be decided by physical evidence. Naturally, we retain different mathematical concepts of space. In the case of the continuum hypothesis, the intended interpretation is not physical, but mathematical, so though different set theories may be developed, mathematical evidence will still be relevant to the question of which one is correct. If this were decided, we would probably not retain different mathematical concepts of set. Furthermore, for each logician who, like Mostowski, expects such a proliferation of set theories, there is probably one who does not. For example, Cohen writes:'
In the case of the Continuum Hypothesis, this tendency may possibly, though unlikely, lead to a splitting of set theory depending on how one evaluates the power of the continuum.
Also included in this group are those who look forward to a solution of the continuum problem by the addition of new axioms. 65 I have tried to suggest that such a proliferation of set theories is less likely than Chihara makes it sound, but even if one were to occur, I do not think Gbdel's position would be seriously affected. Chihara continues:66
It may be suggested that G6del might evade this problem by allowing set theory to bifurcate into two theories, both of which treat entities that resemble the 'sets' of our earlier theories, but in one of which, the continuum hypothesis holds, whereas in the other, the hypothesis does not hold. Unfortunately, this maneuver is hardly satisfactory. G6del has argued that we have good reason for thinking there are sets. But could he go on to argue that we have equally good reasons for postulating the existence of two new kinds of entities? Surely his argument would support belief in, at best, one of the new kind of 'sets'.
This last seems to me incorrect. If set theory were to bifurcate, we would say there were two universes, which satisfied ZFC + 2No = ft, and ZFC + 2o o> by, respectively. Of course, there are many logicians who distinguish between two universes of this description even now, namely, L and V. This suggests that the imagined bifurcation might not involve two disjoint universes of different kinds of entities; rather, one might just leave out some of the sets of the other. Of course, this causes no trouble for G6del's view.
Apparently, though, this is not what Chihara has in mind. He imagines that we might someday have reason to believe that there are A-sets and B-sets, and that the universes of A-sets and B-sets satisfy ZFC + 2"o = t, and ZFC + 2"o > V , respectively. Gddel's perceptions and intuitions, Chihara claims, can only involve one of these. Why should this be true? It might be that all the perceivable sets are both A-and B-sets, that all the intuitive beliefs are true of both universes, and that only some theoretical considerations suggest that there are, in fact, two universes, corresponding perhaps to different power set operations that coincide at the lower levels, but diverge later on. This situation is exactly the L versus V situation, and causes no trouble. Chihara must mean that A-sets and B-sets are essentially different kinds of entities. But even on this assumption, it is possible that we have perceived both kinds of sets without noticing their differences, as is not uncommon in the physical sciences. If further development of the theory indicates that two different sorts of entities have been confused, (like gold and iron pyrites, water and heavy water, sets and classes), it is just as natural on G6del's view as on any other to distinguish ' C. Chihara, Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle, p. 65.
